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I. INTRODUCTION
In simple terms, an intermediary transaction tax shelter comprises (1) 
a seller who desires to sell stock of a “target” corporation, (2) an 
intermediary corporation, (3) a purchaser who desires to purchase the
assets rather than the stock of the target, and (4) an accompanying tax 
liability that is triggered on the sale of these assets.1  This Casenote  
examines the extent of the seller’s tax liability in such a transaction as 
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set forth under the recent case of Starnes v. Commissioner.2  Before 
turning to the case, it may be helpful to consider the following 
hypothetical. 
Suppose a seller owns 100% of a target corporation, in which he has a 
basis of $5 million.  The target has appreciated assets with a total fair 
market value of $10 million and a basis of $5 million.  A purchaser
wants to buy the target’s assets.  The target will recognize a gain of $5 
million upon selling the assets to the purchaser outright for $10 million.3 
If the target’s gain is taxed at 35%, for example, the target will have a
$1.75 million corporate tax liability resulting from the sale.4  If the seller 
causes the target to liquidate, the seller will be taxed as if he sold his 
stock for the $10 million liquidation proceeds less the target’s tax 
liability of $1.75 million—the seller will be taxed on the $8.25 million 
realized.  If the seller’s gain is taxed at 15%, then the seller will have a 
$487,500 tax liability.5  Accordingly, the seller’s net after-tax profit will 
be $2,762,500.6  Ultimately, the purchaser obtains a $10 million fair market 
value in the assets, the target pays $1.75 million in taxes, the seller pays
$487,500 in taxes, and, in total, the IRS collects $2,237,500 in taxes on
this transaction.7 
2. 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1283 (2011), aff’d, 680 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 2012).  The 
Internal Revenue Service appealed this case to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit, which affirmed the Tax Court’s Starnes decision on May 31, 2012. 
Starnes, 680 F.3d 417. 
3. $10 million amount realized – $5 million basis = $5 million gain. 
4. See I.R.C. § 11(b)(1) (2006).  Internal Revenue Code § 11(b)(1) sets forth the
general rule for calculating the actual amount of tax imposed on corporations as follows: 
The amount of the tax imposed by subsection (a) shall be the sum of— 
(A) 15 percent of so much of the taxable income as does not exceed $50,000, 
(B) 25 percent of so much of the taxable income as exceeds $50,000 but
does not exceed $75,000, 
(C) 34 percent of so much of the taxable income as exceeds $75,000 but
does not exceed $10,000,000, and 
(D) 35 percent of so much of the taxable income as exceeds $10,000,000. 
In the case of a corporation which has taxable income in excess of $100,000
for any taxable year, the amount of tax determined under the preceding 
sentence for such taxable year shall be increased by the lesser of (i) 5 percent 
of such excess, or (ii) $11,750.  In the case of a corporation which has taxable 
income in excess of $15,000,000, the amount of the tax determined under the 
foregoing provisions of this paragraph shall be increased by an additional 
amount equal to the lesser of (i) 3 percent of such excess, or (ii) $100,000. 
Id.
5. Net capital gain is taxed at 15% for taxpayers in the 25% tax bracket.  I.R.C. 
§ 1(h)(1)(C) (2006).
6. $8.25 million amount realized – $5 million basis = $3.25 million gain.  $3.25 
million gain – $487,500 capital gains tax = $2,762,500 gain after tax.
7. $1.75 million taxes at the corporate level + $487,500 taxes at the shareholder 
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Now, consider a second scenario where after the target sells its assets 
to the purchaser, the seller sells its target stock for $10 million to an 
unrelated intermediary, which expects to generate tax losses inside the
target to offset the target’s gain from the sale of its assets.8  If the seller 
is taxed on the gain from the stock sale at 15%, then the seller will have 
a $750,000 tax liability.9 The seller’s net after-tax profit will be $4.25 
million, which is $1,487,500 more than the seller’s net after-tax profit in 
the first scenario.10  Ultimately, the purchaser will still obtain a $10 
million fair market value basis in the assets and the seller will pay
$750,000 in taxes.  Although gain will still be realized inside the target,11 
if all goes well, the intermediary will have sufficient tax attributes to
offset the gain and eliminate the target’s tax liability.  In total, the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) will only collect $750,000 in taxes―as opposed
to $2,237,500―with the difference instead going directly to the seller. 
Typically, the IRS identifies the second scenario as an intermediary 
transaction tax shelter or “Midco” transaction.12  As such, the IRS collapses
the steps in the transaction, thereby disregarding the intermediary’s role
and recasting the transaction much like the first scenario.13  Not only will
8. This is a simplified example.  In reality, the intermediary will expect to be 
compensated for providing its favorable tax attributes and services to the seller.  See 
Thomas W. Avent & Patricia M. Rubirosa, Not All Three-Party Transactions Are
Created Equal, CORP. BUS. TAX’N MONTHLY, May 2003, at 3, 7.  For instance, the 
intermediary might pay the seller less than $10 million for the stock but more than the 
$8.25 million the seller would receive in the first scenario.  See id. The intermediary
would keep the difference between the $10 million value of the stock and the actual
amount it paid for the stock as a fee for its services. See id. 
9. $10 million amount realized – $5 million basis in the stock = $5 million gain. 
10. $10 million amount realized – $5 million basis in the stock – $750,000 tax 
liability = $4.25 million net after tax profit.
11. The entity-level tax that corporations pay on their income is often referred to 
as “inside” tax on “inside gain.”  Paul B. Stephan III, Disaggregation and Subchapter C:
Rethinking Corporate Tax Reform, 76 VA. L. REV. 655, 666 (1990).  The tax that the 
shareholders pay on corporate distributions of after-tax earnings or on the sale of their 
stock is often referred to as “outside” tax on “outside gain.” Id. 
12. Intermediary transactions―Midcos―were first identified as “listed 
transactions” by the IRS in Notice 2001-16, later clarified by Notice 2008-111.  I.R.S. 
Notice 2001-16, 2001-1 C.B. 730; I.R.S. Notice 2008-111, 2008-51 I.R.B. 1299.  In a 
basic intermediary transaction, an intermediary company (M ) buys the stock of a target 
corporation (T ) from the shareholders (X ) and then sells the newly acquired company’s
assets to a buyer (Y ) under a predetermined plan.  I.R.S. Notice 2001-16, 2001-1 C.B. 
730.  Y then claims a tax basis in the assets equal to the price paid, and M uses various 
tax strategies to offset the otherwise reportable gain on the sale of T’s assets. Id.
13. In Notice 2001-16, the IRS stated that it would challenge intermediary






    

















   
   
      
   
the IRS assert a deficiency against the target, but it may also impose
severe penalties under various Internal Revenue Code sections.14  If the
target transfers its assets beyond the reach of the IRS, then the IRS will
allege the transfer was fraudulent and demand that the assets be returned
to the target so that the IRS can collect the taxes.15 In the alternative,
the IRS may impose transferee liability on the selling shareholders to
the extent of the target’s liability pursuant to I.R.C. § 6901.16  To avoid
these legal ramifications, a seller should follow the first scenario and 
experience two levels of taxation on the sale of the target’s appreciated
property—first at the corporate level and then again at the shareholder
level—in order for the purchaser to receive the assets with a step-up in 
basis.17 
In the recent case of Starnes v. Commissioner, however, the selling 
shareholders engaged in a transaction substantially similar to a Midco 
transaction.18  In that case, the target corporation subsequently transferred 
its remaining cash beyond the IRS’s reach, yet the Tax Court found that 
the cash was not fraudulently transferred.19  Thus, the IRS was unable to
in which case Y would not get a step-up in basis in the assets; a sale of T’s assets while T
is still owned by X, in which case T would be liable for a corporate-level tax on the gain 
from the sale and could not use any of the offsetting losses provided by M; or as 
otherwise appropriate depending on the facts. Id.  The notice also set forth various 
penalties that the IRS could impose against participants or their advisors.  See id.
14. See I.R.S. Notice 2008-111, 2008-51 I.R.B. 1299.  These penalties include the
following: a $200,000 penalty for a participant’s failure to disclose a listed transaction 
pursuant to § 6707A; a $200,000 penalty or a penalty of 50–75% of gross income 
derived for a material advisor’s failure to make a disclosure pursuant to § 6707(a); a 
$10,000-per-day penalty for a material advisor’s failure to provide a list of persons 
advised in connection with the transaction pursuant to § 6708(a); an excise-tax, 
disclosure, filing, or payment obligation on tax-exempt investors and entity managers
that invest in listed transactions pursuant to §§ 4965, 6033(a)(2), 6011, and 6071; a 20%
penalty for underpayments related to negligence, substantial understatements, or 
reportable transactions pursuant to § 6662(a); a preparer penalty under § 6694; a 
promoter penalty under § 6700; an aiding-and-abetting penalty under § 6701; and the 
extension of the statute of limitations on the assessment for a person’s failure to disclose
reportable transactions under § 6501(c)(10).  I.R.C. §§ 6707, 6707A, 6708(a), 6662 
(2006); I.R.S. Notice 2008-111, 2008-51 I.R.B. 1299.  Unless otherwise noted, all code
sections in this Casenote are in reference to the Internal Revenue Code.
15. See id. 
16. See Richard M. Wise, Transferee Tax Liability, ST. LOUIS B. J., Summer 1996, 
at 47, 49. 
17. See STEPHEN A. LIND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE TAXATION 5 (7th 
ed. 2008). The purchaser’s stepped-up basis in the assets will be the actual cost of the
assets rather than the target’s historic basis in the assets.  See I.R.C. § 1012 (2006 & 
Supp. 2011).  If the purchaser were instead to purchase the seller’s stock, the purchaser 
would obtain the assets with a “transferred” basis from the target. See I.R.C.
§ 7701(a)(43) (2006).
18. See Starnes v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1283, 1284–87 (2011), aff’d, 680 
F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 2012). 
19. Id. at 1288–89, 1291. 
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collect the target’s unpaid taxes from either the target directly or the
shareholders under the theory of transferee liability.20  This decision could 
effectively amount to a return of the General Utilities doctrine, where 
selling shareholders were able to avoid paying a corporate-level tax on
the sale of appreciated target assets while purchasers were nevertheless able
to obtain a stepped-up basis in the assets.21 
Part II of this Casenote explores the history behind the General 
Utilities doctrine, and Part III explains why the doctrine was ultimately
repealed.22  Part IV then analyzes Starnes and how it could lead to the
resurrection of the General Utilities doctrine through the use of
intermediaries.23  Finally, Part V concludes by drawing attention to the
ease with which other shareholders, eager to avoid a corporate-level tax,
could replicate the Starnes transaction.24 
II. THE GENERAL UTILITIES DOCTRINE 
Subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code is a double-tax regime 
wherein profits from the sale of appreciated corporate property are taxed 
once to the corporation when it sells its property and again to the 
shareholders when the sales proceeds are distributed.25  In  General 
Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, the shareholders of General 
Utilities Company hoped to escape the large corporate-level tax that 
would be imposed on the corporation if it sold its property directly to a 
prospective buyer by having General Utilities first distribute the property 
to its shareholders.26  Shortly thereafter, the shareholders sold the 
property to the buyer on the same terms negotiated by the corporation.27 
20. See id. at 1286–87, 1291. 
21. See Lily Kahng, Resurrecting the General Utilities Doctrine, 39 B.C. L. REV. 
1087, 1110 (1998). 
22. See infra Parts II–III. 
23. See infra Part IV. 
24. See infra Part V. 
25. LIND ET AL., supra note 17, at 5.  The requirement that the corporation 
recognize the gain or loss on the sale or exchange of its property is found in § 1001(c). 
I.R.C. § 1001(c) (2006).  If the proceeds are distributed to the shareholders in the form of
a dividend, the distribution must be taxed to the shareholders as a dividend pursuant to
§ 301(c)(1). I.R.C. § 301(c)(1) (2006).  If the proceeds are distributed to the shareholders in 
redemption of stock or in complete liquidation, the amounts received by a shareholder 
shall be treated as a distribution in part or full payment in exchange for the stock
pursuant to §§ 302(a) and 331(a) respectively.  I.R.C. §§ 302(a), 331(a) (2006). 
26. Gen. Utils. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200, 201–03 (1935). 
27. Id. at 202–03. 
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The Court held that the corporation did not recognize any gain because 
the distribution was not a “sale” and the corporation did not discharge
any indebtedness by distributing the appreciated assets.28 
This decision created a significant tax distinction between two
economically equivalent transactions: (1) a corporation’s direct sale of 
appreciated property followed by the corporation’s distribution of the 
proceeds to the shareholders; and (2) a corporation’s distribution of that
same property to its shareholders followed by the shareholders’ sale of
the property.29 If the corporation sold its appreciated assets to a purchaser, 
then the corporation would recognize gain and correspondingly increase 
its earnings and profits.30  The shareholders would also be taxed to the 
extent of the corporation’s earnings and profits upon receipt of the sale 
proceeds in a corporate distribution.31  However, if the corporation first 
distributed the appreciated property to the shareholders, then the
shareholders would be taxed on the distribution, but the property’s 
appreciation would escape taxation at the corporate level, and the
purchaser would still obtain the property with a fair market value.32 
Despite the incongruity between distributions and sales created under 
General Utilities, Congress codified the case’s holding in the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 by enacting § 311(a), which provided that a 
corporation did not ordinarily recognize gain or loss on a nonliquidating 
distribution of property.33  The IRS further amplified § 311 by extending
the doctrine to include property distributions made in redemption of
stock.34  Congress also enacted §§ 336 and 346 in the 1954 Code, which 
28. Id. at 206.  The government’s opposing argument was that General Utilities
should have been taxed on the distribution because the corporation created indebtedness 
to its shareholders by declaring a dividend and used appreciated property to discharge 
that debt, which was a taxable event.  Id. at 204. 
29. See LIND ET AL., supra note 17, at 175. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. To illustrate the disparate tax treatment of distributions and sales resulting 
from the General Utilities doctrine, assume that the sole shareholder of a target
corporation has a $100,000 basis in target stock. The target’s only asset has a fair market 
value of $500,000 and a $0 adjusted basis.  A purchaser desires to acquire the asset for
$500,000 cash.  If the target distributes the asset to the shareholder first, the target 
recognizes no gain under the General Utilities doctrine.  On a sale of the asset to the 
purchaser for $500,000 following the distribution, the shareholder will recognize gain at
the shareholder level measured by the difference between the shareholder’s basis in the 
target stock and the fair market value of the property, and the purchaser will obtain a 
stepped-up basis in the asset.  If, however, the target sells the asset directly to the
purchaser, the purchaser will still obtain a stepped-up basis in the asset, but the target
will have to recognize a $500,000 gain, and the shareholder will also recognize gain on
the distribution of the after-tax sale proceeds, thereby resulting in double taxation.  See 
id.
33. See I.R.C. § 311(a)(2) (1954) (current version at I.R.C. § 311(a)(2) (2006)). 
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provided similar nonrecognition rules for liquidating and partially
liquidating distributions.35  Finally, Congress went even further by 
providing nonrecognition rules under § 337 for liquidating sales of assets 
followed by distributions of the proceeds to shareholders.36 
Shortly after Congress broadened the scope of the General Utilities
doctrine, tax scholars began calling for its repeal.37  These scholars asserted 
that corporations should not be exempt from tax on the disposition of
appreciated property simply because shareholders were taxed on the
transaction at the shareholder level.38  However, outside of the academic
community there was minimal opposition to the General Utilities doctrine
because many legislators and businesses disliked double taxation, and 
the doctrine provided some relief from this system.39  Others who 
defended the doctrine noted that if it were repealed, then the additional 
35. I.R.C. §§ 336, 346 (1954) (current versions at I.R.C. §§ 336, 346 (2006)). 
36. I.R.C. § 337 (1954) (current version at I.R.C. § 337 (2006)).  Prior to the 1954 
Code, even though a liquidating corporation’s sale of its assets followed by a distribution 
of the proceeds to its shareholders was economically equivalent to the corporation’s 
distribution of all of its assets to its shareholders followed by the shareholders’ sale of
the assets, the latter process had much more favorable tax results.  See LIND ET AL., supra
note 17, at 338.  This motivated taxpayers to delay the sale of corporate assets until after
liquidation in order to avoid a corporate-level tax.  Id.  This strategy was successful in 
United States v. Cumberland Public Service Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950).  See id. at 455– 
56; Kahng, supra note 21, at 1089.  But in Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., the
Court came to the opposite conclusion, holding that a corporate liquidation followed by a 
shareholder asset sale was, in substance, a corporate asset sale followed by liquidation,
thereby resulting in corporate gain recognition.  Comm’r v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 
331, 333–34 (1945); Kahng, supra note 21, at 1089. 
Congress then codified Cumberland by permitting a corporation to avoid gain
recognition upon the sale of its assets so long as the corporation distributed the sale 
proceeds to shareholders in complete liquidation of the selling corporation. Kahng, 
supra note 21, at 1089.  By doing so, Congress broadened the scope of the General
Utilities doctrine by providing corporate nonrecognition not only for distributions of 
appreciated property but also for liquidating sales.  Id. This eliminated the disparate 
treatment between distributions and liquidating sales.  See LIND ET AL., supra note 17, at 
343.  Under either scenario, the corporation did not recognize gain or loss, the 
shareholder recognized gain on the distribution of the assets—or the proceeds from the
sale of the assets—and the buyer obtained a fair-market-value basis in the assets. Id. As
a result, the only tax involved in a distribution or liquidating sale of assets was simply
the capital gain recognized at the shareholder level. Id. 
37. Kahng, supra note 21, at 1093. 
38. See LIND ET AL., supra note 17, at 343. 
39. See id.; George K. Yin, General Utilities Repeal: Is Tax Reform Really Going 




   










     
   
 
 






tax would, in many cases, be imposed on merely inflationary gains of 
closely held family businesses.40 
III. REPEAL OF THE GENERAL UTILITIES DOCTRINE 
Despite these arguments in favor of the General Utilities doctrine, 
Congress placed restrictions on the doctrine in the Tax Reform Act of 
1969.41 After the initial codification of the doctrine in 1954, a
corporation wishing to dispose of appreciated property would generally
not sell the property but would instead redeem a portion of its own stock 
in exchange for the property so as to avoid recognition of gain at the 
corporate level.42  Congress perceived this as an abuse and thus enacted 
§ 311(d) in the 1969 Act.43  This new provision appeared to be an 
outright repeal of the General Utilities doctrine with respect to
redemptions, but it was filled with exceptions.44  Yet even with the 1969 
40. See Reform of Corporate Taxation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 98th 
Cong. 151 (1983) (statement of John S. Nolan, Partner, Miller & Chevalier).  This was 
because closely held family businesses were more likely to undergo complete liquidations 
than large publicly held companies. See id.; John S. Nolan, Taxing Corporate Distributions 
of Appreciated Property: Repeal of the General Utilities Doctrine and Relief Measures,
22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 97, 101 (1985). 
41. David Scott Sloan & John M. Loalbo, The Ultimate Disposition of General 
Utilities: An Analysis of the General Utilities Doctrine from Inception to Repeal, 6 B.U. 
J. TAX L. 177, 184–85 (1988). 
42. See id. at 184.  This strategy was commonly employed by insurance companies,
which had large investment portfolios of appreciated stock in other companies. Id. at
184–85.  Rather than sell the stock, the insurance companies would redeem a portion of 
their own shareholders’ stock in exchange for the appreciated portfolio investments.  Id.
at 185. 
43. Id. 
44. See id.; I.R.C. § 311(d) (1969) (current version at I.R.C. § 311 (2006)). 
Section 311(d) provided that if a corporation disposed of its property through 
redemption, the corporation was deemed to have sold its property for its fair market 
value and subsequently completed the redemption with the proceeds of the sale.  See id.
With respect to exceptions, § 311(a) nonrecognition still applied to the following
redemption transactions found in § 311(d)(2)(A)–(G): 
a. a redemption in complete termination of a shareholder’s interest . . . , if he 
had owned at least 10% of the corporation’s stock for the twelve-month
period ending on the date of the redemption distribution; 
b. a distribution of the stock or obligation of a corporation engaged in
business, if it had not received a substantial portion of its assets in a section
351 transaction within the five-year period ending on the distribution date
and if at least 50% of its stock had been owned by the distributing
corporation at any time within the nine-year period ending one year before
the distribution; 
c. a distribution pursuant to certain antitrust decrees; 
d. a distribution to which section 303(a) applied; 
e. a distribution to a private foundation; 
f. a distribution by a regulated investment company; and 
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Act in place, nonrecognition rules still applied to property dividends,
liquidating distributions, partially liquidating distributions, and liquidating 
sales.45 
Although repeal of the General Utilities doctrine was occurring 
gradually, movement toward complete legislative reform began gaining 
momentum in the 1980s.46  In 1982, Congress adopted the Tax Equity
and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA), which eliminated nonrecognition 
for distributions made in partial liquidation.47  But TEFRA also took a
step back in the movement toward repeal of the General Utilities
doctrine by enacting § 338, which enabled purchasing corporations to 
treat certain stock purchases as asset purchases so as to obtain a stepped-
up basis in the assets.48  If an acquiring corporation made a § 338
election, pursuant to § 337 the target would be treated as if it sold all of 
its assets at the close of the acquisition date and subsequently repurchased 
those assets.49  Because § 337 allowed for nonrecognition in liquidating 
sales, the target would recognize no gain or loss on the deemed sale of 
the assets, yet the purchasing corporation would still receive a tax-free 
stepped-up basis in the assets.50 
Congress once again moved closer to complete repeal of the General 
Utilities doctrine with the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984.51  Seeking to 
“revert back to a general rule of gain recognition which would be 
Bernard Wolfman et al., Taxing Corporate Distributions of Appreciated Property: Repeal of
General Utilities Doctrine, Relief Measures and Entity Reclassification Proposals, 22 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 77 app. at 89–90 (1985) (citations omitted). 
45. See Sloan & Loalbo, supra note 41, at 186. 
46. See LIND ET AL., supra note 17, at 343. 
47. See Sloan & Loalbo, supra note 41, at 186.  Appreciated, straight dividend,
and complete liquidation distributions as well as liquidating sales, however, remained 
immune from tax at the corporate level. See Wolfman et al., supra note 44, at 90.  
Moreover, even though the General Utilities doctrine was repealed with respect to
distributions made in partial liquidations under TEFRA, there was still an exception 
providing nonrecognition for distributions of qualified stock made to a noncorporate 
shareholder who owned at least 10% of the corporation’s stock and held such stock for at 
least five years prior to the partial liquidation. I.R.C. § 311(e)(1)(A) (1982) (current 
version at I.R.C. § 311); Sloan & Loalbo, supra note 41, at 190. 
48. See Sloan & Loalbo, supra note 41, at 192–93. 
49. Id.  Prior to TEFRA, an acquiring corporation could achieve a stepped-up basis
for some target assets while avoiding unfavorable tax treatment for other assets by
structuring the acquisition as a partial purchase of assets and a partial purchase of stock. 
Id. at 192.  TEFRA attempted to alleviate this inconsistency by enacting § 338, thereby
requiring corporations to treat certain stock purchases as asset purchases. Id.
50. See id. at 193. 
51. See id. at 196. 
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consistent with the ‘double tax system’ of corporations and shareholders,” 
Congress modified § 311(d) to require gain recognition on corporate 
distributions of appreciated property in redemptions, partial liquidations, 
and property dividends.52 
Finally, Congress completely repealed the General Utilities doctrine 
in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, even with respect to liquidating
distributions and sales pursuant to §§ 336 and 337.53 The 1986 Act also 
restricted the tax benefits of § 338(a) as set forth under TEFRA.54 
A purchaser who acquired the stock of a target corporation could still 
make a § 338(a) election and receive a stepped-up basis in the target
assets, but because the target’s deemed sale of the assets would no 
longer be tax free under § 337, purchasers rarely made the election.55 
Complete repeal of the General Utilities doctrine ultimately came
about not only because it had become exceedingly complex and riddled 
with exceptions but also because Congress believed that it tended to 
undermine the corporate income tax system.56  Under normally applicable
52. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 98-432, pt. 2, at 1190 (1984)); see Deficit 
Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 54, 98 Stat. 494, 568 (codified at I.R.C. 
§ 311(d)(1) (1984) (current version at I.R.C. § 311)).  With respect to exceptions, 
nonrecognition still applied to the following:
1) a distribution of at least 50% of the value of stock or obligations of a
controlled corporation to a qualified shareholder; 
2) a distribution pursuant to a § 303 redemption; 
3) a distribution to a private foundation in redemption of § 537(b)(2)(A) 
stock; [and] 
4) a distribution by a regulated investment company in redemption of stock
upon the demand of a shareholder.
Sloan & Loalbo, supra note 41, at 197 (citations omitted). 
53. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 631, 100 Stat. 2085, 2269–72
(codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 336–337 (2006)).  Now, a liquidating corporation must
recognize gain or loss on the distribution of property in complete liquidation as if the 
property were sold to the distributee at its fair market value.  I.R.C. § 336(a).  By
modifying the law in this way, Congress greatly increased the tax cost of a complete 
liquidation because when a corporation makes a liquidating distribution of appreciated
property, there will typically be tax at the corporate level as well as the shareholder level.
LIND ET AL., supra note 17, at 345. 
54. See Sloan & Loalbo, supra note 41, at 202–03. 
55. See id. at 203. Stock purchasers who want to obtain a stepped-up basis in the 
target assets may instead make a § 338(h)(10) election if the target is a member of an 
affiliated group of corporations. See I.R.C. § 338(h)(10) (2006).  One of the benefits of a 
§ 338(h)(10) election is that it allows the target to be treated as a member of the affiliated
group for purposes of the deemed sale.  See id.  Thus, if the group has losses elsewhere, 
these can be used to offset the gain from the target’s deemed sale. See id.
56. H.R. REP. NO. 99-426, at 281 (1985).  Another reason Congress finally 
repealed the General Utilities doctrine in the liquidation setting was because the doctrine
produced “many incongruities and inequities in the tax system.”  Id.  The House Ways
and Means Committee believed that as a result of the doctrine,
[e]conomically, a liquidating distribution [was] indistinguishable from a 
nonliquidating distribution; yet the Code provide[d] a substantial preference 
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tax principles, a corporation could only escape taxation on its gains from 
the disposition of appreciated property if the recipient obtained a 
carryover basis in the transferred property.57  This practice assured that 
any appreciation would eventually be taxed.58  Under the General Utilities
doctrine, however, a corporation could dispose of its property without 
experiencing a corporate-level tax while the recipient could still obtain a 
stepped-up basis in the assets.59  After the doctrine was repealed, a 
corporation was required to recognize full gain on redemptions, property 
dividends, liquidating distributions, partially liquidating distributions, 
and liquidating sales.60  Moreover, the purchaser of a target corporation’s
stock could no longer elect to have the target corporation step up its 
asset basis tax-free by making a § 338(a) election.61 
IV. STARNES V. COMMISSIONER 
The tensions created by the General Utilities doctrine finally appeared 
to be resolved when the doctrine was completely repealed in 1986.62 
Since then, repeal of the doctrine has come to stand for the proposition 
that a corporation will generally be taxed at the corporate level when it
divests itself of its appreciated assets, regardless of how the assets are
divested, if a purchaser is to obtain a stepped-up basis in the assets.63 
[was] able to obtain a basis in assets equal to their fair market value, although
the transferor recognize[d] no gain (other than possibly recapture amounts) on
the sale.  The tax benefits may [have made] the assets more valuable in the 
hands of the transferee than in the hands of the present owner.  The effect may 
[have been] to induce corporations with substantial appreciated assets to
liquidate and transfer their assets to other corporations for tax reasons, when 
economic considerations might [have] indicate[d] a different course of action.
Accordingly, the General Utilities rule may [have been] responsible, at least in
part, for the dramatic increase in corporate mergers and acquisitions . . . .  The 
committee believe[d] that the Code should not artificially encourage corporate 
liquidations and acquisitions, and believe[d] that repeal of the General Utilities
rule [was] a major step towards that goal. 
Id. at 281–82. 
57. Id. at 282. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. See Kahng, supra note 21, at 1096. 
61. See id. 
62. See id. 
63. See id. Taxpayers did not accept this proposition easily. See Avent & 
Rubirosa, supra note 8, at 4.  Rather, many taxpayers began participating in complex
transactions, such as mirror subsidiaries transactions and son-of-mirror transactions, in













     















Yet the Tax Court’s decision in Starnes may once again provide selling
shareholders with an opportunity to avoid paying taxes at the corporate 
level while nevertheless providing purchasers with an unwarranted step
up in basis.64  But shareholders following Starnes will not achieve this
end by avoiding the existence of a corporate-level tax on the distribution 
or sale of their assets as was provided under the General Utilities
doctrine.65  Rather, shareholders will achieve this by placing the target’s
corporate-level tax in an intermediary entity with offsetting tax attributes, 
which subsequently transfers the target assets out of the reach of the
IRS.66 
A.  The Facts 
In Starnes, the parties participated in a transaction resembling a 
typical Midco transaction.67  In early 2003, the shareholders of Tarcon, 
Inc. negotiated for the sale of its real estate to a third party, ProLogis.68 
The shareholders then met with representatives of MidCoast Investments,
Inc., who proposed to purchase the stock of Tarcon.69  The MidCoast 
representatives assured Tarcon shareholders that Tarcon would continue
to operate under MidCoast’s ownership and that Tarcon’s 2003 tax 
liabilities would be paid.70  In October 2003, Tarcon completed the sale of
its real estate to ProLogis for $3.18 million, thereby creating a federal and
tax-free, stepped-up basis in assets.  Id.  But Congress amended statutory provisions and 
the Treasury promulgated regulations to suppress these transactions when it became 
apparent that they were abusive. See id.
64. See Starnes v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1283 (2011), aff’d, 680 F.3d 417 
(4th Cir. 2012).
65. See Avent & Rubirosa, supra note 8, at 6. 
66. See id. at 6–7. 
67. Genelle Forsberg, Midco Decisions in Tax Court, GENELLE FORSBERG LAW 
OFFICE, http://www.forsberglaw.com/whatsnew.htm (last visited June 3, 2012). 
68. Starnes, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1284.  Tarcon was a corporation organized in 
North Carolina in 1956 that operated a freight consolidation business.  Id. Tarcon’s 
business operations and revenues declined in the 1980s because of deregulation of the
trucking industry. Id.  By 2003, Tarcon had discontinued its freight consolidation
business, and its primary business was leasing warehouse space of approximately
201,600 square feet on Granite Street in Charlotte, North Carolina.  Id.  The buyer 
interested in this Granite Street property, ProLogis, was a Maryland real estate
investment trust.  See Opening Brief for the Appellant at 6, Starnes, 680 F.3d 417 (No.
11-1636). 
69. Starnes, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1284–85.  MidCoast claimed that it was 
interested in acquiring Tarcon’s stock because it was “an effective way to grow [its] 
parent company’s core asset recovery operations.”  Id. at 1284. 
70. Id. at 1285.  In the brochure MidCoast sent to Tarcon agents, MidCoast 
asserted that it would put Tarcon into its “asset recovery business” and operate Tarcon
on a “go-forward basis.”  Id. at 1284.  MidCoast further asserted that Tarcon would not
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state tax liability of $881,627.74.71  The transaction enabled ProLogis to 
obtain a stepped-up basis in the property.  Shortly thereafter, Tarcon 
shareholders completed their stock sale to MidCoast.72  The purchase 
price of the stock was equal to Tarcon’s cash on hand—$3,092,052.54— 
less 56.25% of Tarcon’s tax liabilities—$495,915.60.73  After the sale,
“Tarcon shareholders had no further communications with MidCoast or 
knowledge with respect to Tarcon’s funds.”74  Tarcon shareholders reported
the gain from the sale of the Tarcon stock on their individual income tax
returns.75 
MidCoast then sold Tarcon to a Bermuda company, Sequoia Capital, 
L.L.C., which subsequently purchased and sold “inflated basis assets” to
generate losses for Tarcon.76  When Tarcon filed its 2003 corporate 
return, it claimed these large losses to offset the gains from the sale of
the Tarcon assets.77  As a result, Tarcon paid no taxes.78  The  IRS  
determined that the overall transaction was “substantially similar to a 
[Midco] transaction” or, in the alternative, substantively “a sale of the
Tarcon assets to ProLogis followed by a redemption of Tarcon stock 
owned by the Tarcon shareholders.”79  Thus, the IRS denied Tarcon’s
reported losses and determined a tax deficiency in the amount of 
$855,237.80  Although Tarcon did not contest the determination, Tarcon
71. Id. at 1285. 
72. See id. at 1285.  In Notice 2001-16, the IRS describes a Midco transaction as 
one in which the selling shareholders first sell their stock to an intermediary. I.R.S.
Notice 2001-16, 2001-1 C.B. 730.  It is only after the sale of the stock that the target
corporation sells its assets to a purchaser.  See id. In Starnes, on the other hand, the
target corporation sold its assets to the purchaser before the selling shareholders sold
their stock to the intermediary. See Starnes, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1285.  In Notice 
2008-111, however, the IRS clarified that a transaction can be a Midco transaction
irrespective of the order in which the target’s stock or assets are disposed.  I.R.S. Notice 
2008-111, 2008-51 I.R.B. 1299. 
73. Id.  MidCoast only saved the Tarcon shareholders 54.75% in corporate-level 
taxes.  See id.  The other 56.25% of the tax liability that was deducted from the purchase 
price of the Tarcon stock was likely intended to be MidCoast’s service fee for providing 
its tax attributes to the selling shareholders to offset Tarcon’s gain. See Avent & 
Rubirosa, supra note 8, at 7. 
74. Starnes, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1286. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 1285, 1289.  Sequoia purchased Tarcon from MidCoast for $2,861,465.96. 
Opening Brief for the Appellant, supra note 68, at 15. 
77. Starnes, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1286. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 1286–87. 
80. Id. at 1286.  The deficiency primarily resulted from the IRS’s disallowance of 











   
  
   
  
 








     
 
   
 
  
   





had already transferred all of its cash out of the corporation shortly after 
the sale of its assets, thereby taking the cash out of the IRS’s reach.81  As
a result, the IRS was unable to collect on any portion of the tax from
Tarcon directly.82  The IRS then pursued the selling shareholders of the
Tarcon stock as transferees pursuant to § 6901, contending that Tarcon’s 
transfer of its assets outside of the IRS’s reach was fraudulent.83 
B.  The Holding
In analyzing the shareholders’ liability as transferees, the Tax Court 
noted that the existence and extent of transferee liability was governed
by the laws of North Carolina, the state where the transfer occurred.84 
and reported on Tarcon’s Form 4797, Sales of Business Property, for the 2003 tax year. 
Id.  The tax due was determined mainly by reference to the tax attributable to Tarcon’s 
sale of the Granite Street property to ProLogis.  Opening Brief for the Appellant, supra
note 68, at 16.  The IRS also applied an accuracy-related penalty under § 6662(h) in the 
amount of $342,094. Starnes, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1286.  “Tarcon did not file a petition
with [the Tax] Court [necessary] to contest the IRS determinations outlined in the notice
of deficiency.” Id. 
81. See Opening Brief for the Appellant, supra note 68, at 15.  Following the
closing of the ProLogis and MidCoast sales, MidCoast transferred $3,092,052.54 to a 
new bank account in Tarcon’s name.  Id.  MidCoast then sold Tarcon to Sequoia for 
$2,861,465.96.  Id. Two days after MidCoast sold Tarcon to Sequoia, Tarcon transferred 
all of its funds to an account with Deutsche Bank in its own name.  Id.  Then, on 
December 1, 2003, Tarcon transferred $2,960,000 from the Deutsche Bank account to an 
account located in the Cook Islands in the name of Delta Trading Partners and 
transferred $126,822 to a MidCoast bank account.  Id.  After these transfers, Tarcon 
never had more than $132,320 in any of its accounts.  Id. 
82. Starnes, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1286.  Because Tarcon did not pay any portion 
of the assessment, “in March 2008 the IRS filed Federal tax liens with the Clerk of
Superior Court Union County, Monroe, North Carolina; the Clerk of Superior Court 
Mecklenburg County, Charlotte, North Carolina; the North Carolina Secretary of State, 
Raleigh, North Carolina; and the County Recorder Clark County, Las Vegas, Nevada.” 
Id. 
83. Id. at 1287. 
84. Id. Although under Commissioner v. Stern, state law governs the substantive 
liability of a transferee, in Ginsberg v. Commissioner, the Second Circuit held that 
federal law governs the procedure for enforcing such liability.  Comm’r v. Stern, 357 
U.S. 39, 47 (1958); Ginsberg v. Comm’r, 305 F.2d 664, 667 (2d Cir. 1962).  Under
federal law, transferees may be subject to personal liability on property transfers pursuant to
§ 6901.  I.R.C. § 6901 (2006).
The substantive law determinative of § 6901 transferee liability can vary from state to 
state. See James K. Brown, Transferee Liability and the C Reorganization, 40 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 380, 398 (1968).  If all participants and assets involved in the transaction are 
located in the same state, choosing which state’s laws to apply is relatively
straightforward. Id.  The choice of law rules become more complicated, however, when
multiple states are involved. Id.  Federal cases provide little guidance because not many
have dealt directly with this problem.  Id.  One option to resolve the issue is for the court
to rely on federal choice of law rules to determine the applicable state law.  Id.
Alternatively, the court can rely on the choice of law rules of the state in which it sits to 
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North Carolina had adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act 
(UFTA),85 which provides that a transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent
if the debtor made the transfer without receiving a reasonably equivalent
value for the transfer and the debtor 
(a) [w]as engaged in or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for
which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in 
relation to the business or transaction; or
(b) [i]ntended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur, debts beyond
the debtor’s ability to pay as they became due.86 
The IRS argued that the stock sale and subsequent transfer of the funds 
out of Tarcon should be viewed as a single integrated transfer under the 
(citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496–97 (1941)).  Even 
though liability pursuant to § 6901 rests on state law, because the section enforces a 
federal right, the courts can utilize federal rather than state choice of law rules in
determining which state’s laws should apply. See Brown, supra, at 398 n.126. 
When applying choice of law rules to fraudulent conveyance cases, courts can adopt
several different approaches.  Id. at 398.  One approach is to apply the internal law of the 
state of the situs of the assets at the time of the transfer.  Id. The situs rules were thought
to protect purchasers’ expectations of property rights as well as state control over 
property located in its jurisdiction. Id.
But § 6901 transferee liability is not based on the property rights that the situs rules 
seek to protect.  Id. at 399.  Rather than attempt to set aside a transferor’s conveyance of
property, the IRS seeks money damages from the transferee on the grounds that the asset
transfer was fraudulent.  Id.  Thus, transferee liability cases are more akin to tort cases 
than property cases.  Id.  It may be more practical, therefore, for courts to employ the 
choice of law rules used in tort cases than those used in property cases.  See id.  For  
instance, the court could apply the laws of the state where the transfer occurred—the 
state where the agreement was closed. See, e.g., Adams v. Comm’r, 70 T.C. 373, 390
(1978), aff’d, 688 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1982). 
85. Starnes, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1287 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-23.4 (2011)).
The UFTA adopted in North Carolina has also been adopted by almost every other U.S. 
state. See Legislative Enactment Status: Fraudulent Transfer Act, UNIFORM LAW 
COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeMap.aspx?title=Fraudulent Transfer
Act (last visited June 3, 2012).  The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA) was 
the predecessor to the UFTA. See Richard J. Szemiot, Legislative Summary, The Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act―1988 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 74 (West), 13 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 
101, 101 (1990).  One difference between the two acts is that under the UFCA, a creditor
was required to demonstrate a lack of both fair consideration and good faith to establish 
a fraudulent transfer, whereas under the UFTA, a creditor only has to demonstrate a lack
of fair consideration.  Id.

























UFTA.87  It took the position that Tarcon transferred the money out of
the IRS’s reach without receiving equivalent value.88 
The court held that the party seeking to establish transferee liability
must prove that the multiple transactions were linked by showing that 
the purported transferee had “actual or constructive knowledge of the 
entire scheme.”89  Prior to the stock sale, a MidCoast representative provided 
Tarcon’s agent with an informational brochure claiming the Tarcon
shareholders would recognize numerous benefits by selling their stock to
MidCoast, including the “maximized net after-tax proceeds.”90  As such, 
negotiations for the sale of the stock focused primarily on the percentage
of Tarcon’s outstanding tax liabilities that would be applied to reduce 
the share purchase price.91  Nevertheless, the court found the brochure
alone did not sufficiently establish that the shareholders had actual
knowledge of MidCoast’s scheme because the shareholders were not 
aware of Tarcon’s postclosing activities.92  The court also explicitly 
noted, rather incongruously, that further inquiry by the shareholders was 
“likely warranted” considering they received proceeds in excess of cash
on hand less calculated tax liabilities.93  Additionally, the court held that
the IRS had not proven that the Tarcon shareholders should have 
inquired further simply by alleging that the shareholders could not have 
believed that MidCoast planned to generate a profit with Tarcon.94  Thus,
the court found the shareholders did not have constructive knowledge of the
scheme.95  Accordingly, the court refused to collapse the stock sale and 
Tarcon’s subsequent transfer of the funds into a single transaction to 
determine whether Tarcon received reasonably equivalent value because
87. Id. at 1288; M. Levine & A. Roberts, Tax Court Finds Taxpayers Not Liable as
Transferees in Two MIDCO Transaction Cases, FOCUS ON TAX CONTROVERSY & LITIG., 
Mar. 2011, at 10, 15. 
88. Starnes, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1288; Levine & Roberts, supra note 87, at 15. 
89. Starnes, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1289.  Ordinarily, a successful fraudulent 
conveyance action enables the IRS to have the transaction avoided, thereby causing the 
fraudulently conveyed property to be returned to the transferor as if the conveyance had
never occurred. See Steve Johnson & E.L. Wiegand, Using State Fraudulent Conveyance 
Law To Collect Federal Taxes, NEV. LAW., June 2006, at 14, 14.  This enables the IRS to 
proceed against the transferor.  Id.  In a transferee liability case, however, the IRS does 
not seek to set the transaction aside but rather seeks to recover a money judgment from 
the transferee.  See id.
90. Starnes, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1284. 
91. See id. at 1285. 
92. See id. at 1289. 
93. Id. 
94. Id.; Forsberg, supra note 67. 
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the shareholders lacked both actual and constructive knowledge of the 
scheme.96 
Instead, the court ignored the subsequent transfer of the funds and 
only evaluated whether Tarcon received reasonably equivalent value in
the stock sale in order to determine if the shareholders could be found 
liable as transferees.97  The court found that Tarcon did receive reasonably 
equivalent value in the transaction because MidCoast did not merely
provide a circular flow of cash for the stock but rather introduced a fresh
“infusion of cash” into the transaction when it paid $2,596,136.94 for the 
Tarcon stock.98  Thus, the court rejected the IRS’s theories under the
96. See Starnes, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1289; Forsberg, supra note 67.  Arguably, 
the court should not have used a “knowledge of the entire scheme” standard to begin 
with in evaluating whether or not to extend transferee liability to the shareholders.  See 
Opening Brief for the Appellant, supra note 68, at 52.  Rather, the court should have 
applied the substance over form doctrine, which does not include an evaluation of 
whether the shareholders had a tax-avoidance motive.  See id. at 51–53.  Courts have 
applied this standard to many constructive distribution cases “where there was no
suggestion of any nefarious scheme.”  Id. at 53; see, e.g., Wall v. United States, 164 F.2d
462, 464 (4th Cir. 1947) (holding that when a corporation satisfies the personal debt of 
its shareholders, it is as if the corporation paid a dividend to the shareholders who 
subsequently used this payment to satisfy the debt). 
97. See Starnes, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1288–89. 
98. Id. at 1288.  Typically, the intermediary arranges financing for the purchase of
the stock through a bridge loan, which is secured by the assets of the target company.
See Avent & Rubirosa, supra note 8, at 10.  Contemporaneously with or shortly after the 
stock sale, the intermediary sells the target’s assets to another buyer.  See id.  The bridge 
loan is then repaid from the proceeds, and the intermediary retains any excess proceeds
as a fee for its services.  See id.  This circular cash flow makes it more likely that the IRS 






























   
 
   
 
UFTA99 and determined that the shareholders were not liable as transferees 
for Tarcon’s tax deficiency.100  
C.  Starnes’s Significance
When the dust settled after Starnes, ProLogis obtained the Tarcon
assets with a stepped-up basis, Tarcon shareholders avoided paying 
approximately $385,712 in corporate-level taxes, MidCoast sold Tarcon
99. The court also refused to find the shareholders liable as transferees under 
North Carolina’s trust fund doctrine.  See Starnes, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1290–91.  North
Carolina law allows certain claims against dissolved corporations to be enforced against
their shareholders.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-08 (2011).  But the court determined that 
the trust fund doctrine was inapplicable in Starnes because the IRS had “not presented
evidence regarding circumstances that existed amounting to a winding up or dissolution
of Tarcon aside from claiming that Tarcon no longer had a business activity.”  Starnes, 
101 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1291.  At the time the Tarcon shareholders sold their stock to
MidCoast, however, Tarcon had “no assets other than approximately $3.1 million in
cash; no liabilities other than approximately $881,000 in taxes; and no other ‘contracts, 
agreements, obligations, undertakings or commitments.’”  Opening Brief for the 
Appellant, supra note 68, at 42.  Based on this economic reality, it appears that the 
shareholders did indeed liquidate Tarcon, and the court therefore should have considered 
the trust fund doctrine.  See id. at 40. 
100. Starnes, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1290–91.  By emphasizing that Tarcon received
reasonably equivalent value not only because the Tarcon shareholders received cash for 
their stock but also because this cash was a fresh “infusion of cash” rather than a circular 
flow of cash, the court suggested that transactions involving intermediaries using their
own cash rather than a bridge loan to finance a stock purchase are more likely to be
viewed as legitimate.  See id. at 1288.  This could open the door for shareholders to
successfully shelter corporate gains by infusing cash into transactions that otherwise 
mirror intermediary transaction tax shelters. See id. 
Moreover, the court’s determination that there was an infusion of cash in Starnes may
have been misguided. See Opening Brief for the Appellant, supra note 68, at 63.  In
coming to this conclusion, the court relied on evidence that MidCoast paid
$2,596,136.94 for the Tarcon stock and Tarcon received $3,092,052.54 in a “post-
closing bank account.”  Id. at 62.  But in the actual terms of the share-purchase
agreement, the shareholders were not required to transfer Tarcon’s $3,092,052.54 to a 
postclosing bank account in Tarcon’s name.  See id.  Rather, “it required the
Shareholders to transfer the funds prior to the closing to a trust account at Moore & Van
Allen, and then, on the day of the closing, to transfer the funds ‘to the Purchasers,’ i.e., 
MidCoast.”  Id. (citations omitted). This indicates that MidCoast intended to
immediately receive back the purchase money rather than infuse it into the transaction.
See id. at 63.  Even though MidCoast deposited the cash into a newly established Tarcon
bank account the next day, it drained this Tarcon bank account just three weeks later by
transferring the funds offshore.  See id. at 63–64.  But the court collapsed the 
shareholders’ transfer of Tarcon’s cash to MidCoast and MidCoast’s subsequent transfer 
of the cash to a Tarcon bank account, and thus found that MidCoast infused cash into the 
transaction. See id. at 64. 
For the sake of consistency, it would follow that the court would also collapse
MidCoast’s later transfer of the cash out of Tarcon, thereby finding the shareholders 
liable for the fraudulent transfer as transferees.  See id. Yet the court refused to do so 
because the shareholders lacked knowledge of Tarcon’s postclosing activities.  See 
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to Sequoia, which offset Tarcon’s entire tax liability of $881,627.74 with
other losses, and the IRS was unable to collect Tarcon’s unpaid taxes 
from either Tarcon or its shareholders.101  The results of the case are
strikingly similar to those once permitted under the General Utilities
doctrine.102  In response to a 1983 staff report of the Senate Finance
Committee concerning corporate income tax reform, an American Bar
Association task force identified several areas where the General Utilities
doctrine presented problems.103  One of the major problems noted in the
task force report was that “double tax[ing]” interim distributions but 
only “single tax[ing]” the sale and subsequent liquidation of corporate 
assets could result in serious revenue losses.104  Corporations with highly 
appreciated inventory that would ordinarily distribute current earnings 
via dividends could reduce the tax liability on their inventory by almost 
75% if they sold all of their assets and liquidated.105  Moreover, the Joint 
Committee on Taxation stated in its 1986 annual tax expenditure
estimate that for the five-year period from 1987 to 1991, the tax preference 
created by the General Utilities doctrine was estimated to decrease
corporate and individual income tax liabilities by $26.1 billion.106 
101. See id. at 1285–87, 1291.
102. See Avent & Rubirosa, supra note 8, at 3–4. 
103. Task Force, Am. Bar Ass’n Section of Taxation, Income Taxation of Corporations
Making Distributions with Respect to Their Stock, 37 TAX LAW. 625, 625 (1984).  The 
1983 Senate Finance Committee Staff Report to which the task force report was a reaction 
proposed that a corporation that distributes appreciated property to its shareholders 
should recognize gain.  See STAFF OF  S. COMM. ON FIN., 98TH CONG., THE REFORM AND 
SIMPLIFICATION OF THE INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS 6–7 (Comm. Print 1983). 
 104. Task Force, supra note 103, at 631–32. 
105. Id. at 632. 
106. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL 
TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 1987–1991 12 tbl.1 (Comm. Print 1986).  But in 
April 1985, the estimate was $60.9 billion over the five-year period from 1986–1990. 
See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX 
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 1986–1990 14 tbl.1 (Comm. Print 1985).  The Joint
Committee did not provide an explanation as to why there was such a large discrepancy 
between the 1985 and 1986 Reports.  See Yin, supra note 39, at 1116 n.57.  In the 1986
Report, the Joint Committee listed 133 separate tax expenditure items, and the tax
preference created by the General Utilities doctrine was the twenty-second largest. Id. at
1116–17.  It surpassed items including
the use of percentage depletion in the oil and gas industry; the special capital 
gains treatment for timber; the rehabilitation tax credit; the special bad debt
reserve rules of financial institutions; the exclusion of capital gains on home
sales for persons 55 or over; the exclusion of interest on state and local
government industrial development bonds; the exclusion of interest on state 




























The result in Starnes could effectively lead to a return to a drastic and 
unwarranted reduction in corporate and individual taxes.  Even though
Tarcon’s agent was aware of the tax benefits of the stock sale, the court
found that in order to collapse the stock sale and asset transfer, the 
shareholders had to have actual or constructive knowledge of the scheme 
itself.107 This included “the sale of Tarcon to Sequoia and Sequoia’s
subsequent purchase and sale of ‘inflated basis assets’ to purportedly 
generate losses for Tarcon.”108  Requiring the IRS to show that shareholders
involved in Midco transactions were aware of entire schemes to establish
transferee liability imposes an impossibly high burden on the IRS.109  It
also encourages “don’t ask, don’t tell” conduct by the parties to these 
transactions that borders on conspiracy.  As long as shareholders do not
inquire into the details of any subsequent schemes by promoters, they
may be able to plan similar transactions for the purpose of receiving tax 
benefits without being found liable as transferees.110 
The court also respected the stock sale as an independently legitimate 
transaction simply because MidCoast used an “infusion of cash” to 
purchase the Tarcon stock.111  This is in contrast to a typical Midco 
transaction where the intermediary uses funds obtained via a bridge loan
to purchase the target stock and then uses the target assets to repay the
loan, thereby placing the assets out of the IRS’s reach.112  In  Starnes, 
even though the intermediary did not use the Tarcon assets to repay a
bridge loan, the assets were nevertheless transferred out of the IRS’s 
reach.113  The result in both an ordinary bridge loan Midco transaction 
and Starnes is therefore the same.114  Nevertheless, the court did not 
scrutinize the stock purchase in Starnes because MidCoast introduced its
own funds into the transaction rather than funds obtained via a bridge
loan.115  The court sent the message that shareholders looking to legitimize
their Midco-like transactions need only require that the participating 
for child care expenses; the exclusion of Workmen’s Compensation benefits; 
and the exclusion of premiums on group-term life insurance. 
Id. at 1117. 
107. See Starnes v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1283, 1288–89 (2011), aff’d, 680 
F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 2012).
108. Id. at 1289. 
109. See Opening Brief for the Appellant, supra note 68, at 54. 
110. See id. at 55 (“The court’s standard . . . enables participants in an intermediary
tax shelter to easily defeat transferee liability, by choosing willful blindness of the 
promoter’s tax-avoidance intentions and then claiming ignorance of the ‘entire scheme,’ 
as the Shareholders did here.”). 
111. Starnes, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1288.
112. See supra note 98. 
113. See supra note 100.
114. See supra notes 98, 100.
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intermediary use a fresh infusion of cash, even if the results are virtually
identical to those of an ordinary Midco transaction.116 
V. CONCLUSION
Starnes allows shareholders to circumvent congressional intent to 
impose two levels of taxation upon the sale of corporate assets.  If selling 
shareholders lack actual or constructive knowledge of an intermediary’s 
entire postclosing scheme and the intermediary uses a fresh “infusion of 
cash” to purchase target stock, then under Starnes, these shareholders
can engage in Midco-like transactions to shelter a target’s corporate-
level tax while purchasers nevertheless receive a stepped-up basis in the
acquired target assets.117  This could effectively resurrect the General 
Utilities doctrine for closely held corporations and, arguably, others as 
well.  Starnes thus presents an opportunity to substantially reduce corporate 
tax liabilities that can be exploited by parties to such transactions.118  But
the Starnes holding marks a clear departure from the standing twenty-
five year repeal of the General Utilities doctrine, and thus, courts may
interpret the case narrowly in the future.  Indeed, in Feldman v.
Commissioner, another Midco case decided after Starnes, the Tax Court 
held that a target company’s shareholders were liable as transferees
because the intermediary’s offer of a “‘no-cost’ liquidation” as a solution 
to the shareholders’ “tax ‘dilemma’” was enough to put the shareholders 
on notice of the intermediary’s tax-avoidance scheme.119  The IRS is
likely to pursue a zealous campaign of challenges to the Starnes holding 
at every opportunity until it is ultimately overturned or so narrowly
construed as to be without effect.  Corporations would be well advised to 
be cautious in relying on this case for aggressive tax planning until there 
116. See supra notes 96, 100. 
117. See Starnes v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1283, 1286–91 (2011), aff’d, 680 
F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 2012).
118. See Rachelle Y. Holmes, Deconstructing the Rules of Corporate Tax, 25
AKRON TAX J. 1, 14 (2010) (noting that sophisticated taxpayers often create “convoluted 
structures” in an attempt to “achieve tax-favorable results”).
119. Feldman v. Comm’r, 102 T.C.M. (CCH) 612, 623 (2011).  In another Midco 
case decided on the same day as Feldman, the Tax Court found in favor of the taxpayers. 
See Frank Sawyer Trust of May 1992 v. Comm’r, 102 T.C.M. (CCH) 623, 624 (2011).
As in Starnes, the court determined that the taxpayers were not liable as transferees
because they had no actual or constructive knowledge of the purchaser’s postclosing 
intentions and the stock sale was financed by a bank loan. See id. at 627, 632. 
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 is more precedent, or they may risk finding themselves in court as a new 
“test case” for fraud in an IRS-initiated Starnes challenge. 
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